React2Shell exploited to steal secrets from 766 Next.js hosts in automated campaign

Cisco Talos found UAT-10608 using React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) to auto-harvest DB creds, SSH keys, AWS and Stripe keys from 766 Next.js hosts. Check yours.

TechLogHub Engineering Team
April 5, 2026
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Hackers Exploit React2Shell in Automated Credential Theft Campaign

Cisco Talos has documented an automated campaign that uses React2Shell, the critical remote code execution flaw in React Server Components, to break into unpatched Next.js applications and strip them of every secret they can reach. At least 766 hosts were compromised, and on more than nine in ten of them the attackers walked away with database credentials. If you shipped a Next.js App Router app in late 2025 and have not verified your React and Next.js versions since, this is the reason to do it today.

What happened

On 2 April 2026, Talos researchers Asheer Malhotra and Brandon White described a threat cluster they track as UAT-10608. The operation scans the internet indiscriminately, probably using Shodan, Censys or custom scanners, for public Next.js deployments vulnerable to CVE-2025-55182 (CVSS 10.0). Exploitation needs no authentication: a crafted serialised payload sent to a Server Function endpoint executes code on the server.

After exploitation a dropper runs a multi-phase harvesting script with nohup from a randomly named hidden file in /tmp (for example /tmp/.eba9ee1e4.sh). Phases collect environment variables and the Node.js runtime environment, SSH keys, tokens, shell history, cloud instance metadata credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, Docker configuration, process command lines and npm/pip auth files. Each phase calls back to the attacker's C2 on port 8080. Results land in a web dashboard called NEXUS Listener.

Talos counted 766 compromised hosts and 10,120 collected files. Of those hosts, about 91.5% yielded database credentials, 78.2% SSH private keys, 25.6% AWS credentials, 11.4% live Stripe API keys and 8.6% GitHub tokens. An exposed NEXUS instance also held OpenAI, Anthropic and NVIDIA NIM keys, SendGrid and Brevo keys, Telegram bot tokens and webhook secrets.

Who is affected

  • React: react-server-dom-webpack, react-server-dom-turbopack and react-server-dom-parcel 19.0.0, 19.1.0, 19.1.1 and 19.2.0. Fixed in 19.0.1, 19.1.2 and 19.2.1.
  • Next.js App Router: 15.x and 16.x, plus canaries from 14.3.0-canary.77. Fixed in 15.0.5, 15.1.9, 15.2.6, 15.3.6, 15.4.8, 15.5.7 and 16.0.7.
  • Any self-hosted or containerised deployment still running those versions, especially on VMs or Kubernetes where cloud metadata and service account tokens are reachable from the app.

What it means for developers and engineering teams

React2Shell was disclosed and patched in December 2025. This campaign shows how unpatched long-tail apps become a harvest once exploitation is fully automated. The bigger lesson is what the app process could reach. A Next.js server typically holds every secret it needs in environment variables, so code execution equals full secret exposure. Talos also found SSH keys reused across systems and instance metadata reachable without IMDSv2, turning one web app into a foothold for the cloud account.

The harvesting script's phase list is a useful audit checklist for your own deployments. Ask what each phase would find on your servers: what is in the process environment (readable via /proc/self/environ), whether shell history holds pasted credentials, whether ~/.ssh exists inside the container, whether an .npmrc with a publish token was baked into the image, and whether the metadata service answers from inside the container. Every "yes" is something an attacker with code execution walks away with.

Architecture choices that limit damage: short-lived credentials from a secrets manager instead of static env vars, IMDSv2 with a hop limit of 1 so containers cannot reach instance credentials, no host SSH keys or Docker socket inside app containers, and least-privilege IAM roles for the app.

What to do now

  1. Check installed versions:
    npm ls next react-server-dom-webpack react-server-dom-turbopack
    Upgrade to a patched Next.js release for your line and redeploy.
  2. Hunt for compromise on hosts that were exposed while vulnerable: hidden scripts in /tmp, unexpected nohup processes, outbound connections to port 8080, and the Talos C2 IPs (144.172.102.88, 172.86.127.128, 144.172.112.136, 144.172.117.112).
  3. If vulnerable at any point, rotate everything the process could read: database passwords, cloud keys, Stripe, GitHub, AI provider and email API keys, SSH keys.
  4. Enforce IMDSv2 on EC2:
    aws ec2 modify-instance-metadata-options --instance-id i-0123456789abcdef0 --http-tokens required --http-put-response-hop-limit 1
  5. Audit what reaches the client: only intentionally public values should use the NEXT_PUBLIC_ prefix, and server-only secrets must never be returned as props.
  6. Add a WAF or IDS rule for React2Shell payloads in front of apps you cannot patch immediately. Talos lists Snort SID 65554 for CVE-2025-55182.

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