
On 7 April 2026, six US agencies published joint advisory AA26-097A. It warns that an Iran-affiliated APT group is breaking into internet-exposed Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley PLCs and disrupting operations at US critical infrastructure sites. These are not exotic zero-days. Controllers are reachable from the internet, and engineering software is used against them exactly as designed. If you build or run anything that touches operational technology (OT), including SCADA dashboards, historians or IIoT gateways, this is about your network boundary.
What happened
The FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA, the Department of Energy and US Cyber Command's Cyber National Mission Force co-authored the advisory. They say that since at least March 2026, an Iran-affiliated APT group has caused disruption on programmable logic controllers in the Government Services and Facilities, Water and Wastewater, and Energy sectors. Some victims suffered operational disruption and financial loss.
According to the advisory, the actors:
- reached internet-facing PLCs that lacked adequate network segmentation or hardening;
- used Rockwell's own Studio 5000 Logix Designer software to open accepted connections to the controllers;
- extracted device project files and manipulated the data shown on HMI and SCADA displays;
- deployed Dropbear SSH on victim endpoints for remote access over port 22.
The agencies place the activity in the context of rising hostilities between Iran, the US and Israel. They don't name a specific group. They mention CyberAv3ngers, an IRGC-affiliated group behind the late-2023 campaign against Unitronics PLCs, only as background. The advisory lists IOC IP addresses (135.136.1[.]133 and a range of 185.82.73[.]x addresses) seen between January 2025 and March 2026, and it asks defenders to vet them before blocking.
Who is affected
- Owners of Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley CompactLogix and Micro850 PLCs that are reachable from the internet, directly or through a poorly secured cellular modem.
- Other PLC vendors may be next. The advisory notes scanning of ports associated with Siemens S7 devices.
- Utilities, water systems, energy operators and government facilities, plus the integrators and MSPs that manage their remote access.
- Software teams that build HMI, SCADA, telemetry or digital-twin systems, because the attack targets the integrity of the data those systems show.
What it means for developers and engineering teams
The technique is simple. Industrial protocols such as EtherNet/IP (TCP 44818, UDP 2222), Siemens S7comm (102) and Modbus/TCP (502) were designed for trusted plant networks and often have weak authentication or none. Anyone who can reach the port with the vendor's engineering tool can read the project and, if the controller is in a remote-programmable mode, change its logic or tag values. The attacker doesn't need an exploit. They need a route.
Manipulating HMI displays is the part software engineers should take seriously. If the values on a dashboard can be forged, operators make decisions on false data. Systems that ingest PLC tags into a time-series database, a cloud dashboard or an alerting pipeline inherit the same trust problem. Treat values from the field as untrusted input. Use plausibility checks, cross-check them against independent sensors where you can, and alert on unexpected program downloads or mode changes as well as on process values.
Many of these exposures also come from convenience shortcuts: a port-forward so a contractor can connect, a cellular modem with default credentials, or a gateway left open after commissioning. Infrastructure-as-code and firewall reviews should cover the OT edge, not just the cloud.
What to do now
- Remove PLCs from direct internet exposure. Route remote access through a secure gateway or jump host with MFA. Check Shodan or your own external scan for 44818, 2222, 102, 502 and 22 on OT address ranges.
- Set Rockwell controllers' physical mode switch to RUN. Use PROG or REM only during planned downloads, then switch back.
- Review logs for traffic on those ports, especially from overseas hosting providers, and check the advisory's IOC IPs against firewall and VPN logs.
- Look for Dropbear SSH or other unexpected SSH listeners on HMIs, engineering workstations and gateways.
- Keep offline, tested backups of PLC logic and configuration, and compare running projects with known-good copies.
- Harden cellular modems and gateways: change default credentials, update firmware, enable logging and disable Telnet, FTP, VNC, RDP and web services you don't need.
- Alert on mode changes and program downloads through your OT monitoring or historian, not just on process values.