Snowflake customer data stolen via tokens taken in a SaaS integrator breach
Tokens stolen from a breached SaaS integration provider were used against Snowflake and other cloud tenants. What happened and how to lock down integrations.

In early April 2026, more than a dozen companies reported data theft after attackers breached a third-party SaaS integration provider and stole the authentication tokens it held for its customers. Several of the affected tenants were Snowflake accounts. Snowflake itself was not the entry point. The attackers used credentials that customers had handed to an integration. If your data warehouse, CRM or storage bucket trusts a vendor's service account, this is the part of your attack surface you probably review least.
What happened
BleepingComputer reported on 7 April 2026 that more than a dozen companies had suffered data theft after a SaaS integration provider was breached and its authentication tokens were stolen. The attackers then used those tokens to reach the cloud services the provider was connected to, including customer Snowflake environments.
Reporting tied the incident to Anodot, an anomaly-detection company that watches business and revenue metrics in real time. To do that, it connects directly to customers' data sources. Glassbox announced it had acquired Anodot on 4 November 2025. BleepingComputer later linked a Rockstar Games data breach to the same Anodot incident and reported that the ShinyHunters extortion gang was leaking the stolen data on its leak site.
According to the reporting, Snowflake said it had seen unusual activity in a small number of customer accounts connected to the integration. It said it locked those accounts down, notified the affected customers, and maintained that its own platform had not been compromised. Reports also said the attackers tried to use stolen tokens against Salesforce and were detected before they took any data. We could not read the full original report or a primary statement from Snowflake, Anodot or Glassbox, so treat the details in this paragraph as reported, not confirmed.
Who is affected
- Organisations that connected Anodot to their data platforms, especially Snowflake, plus any other system the integration held tokens or service credentials for.
- Data and platform engineering teams that own the service users, OAuth integrations, key pairs or API tokens third-party analytics tools use.
- Downstream customers and end users of the affected companies, whose records may sit in the exfiltrated tables.
The Snowflake platform was not reported as vulnerable. Accounts that never trusted the breached integration are not exposed by this incident.
What it means for developers and engineering teams
This is a supply-chain attack on non-human identities. An analytics or monitoring SaaS needs standing read access to your warehouse, so somebody creates a service user or OAuth integration with a long-lived credential and gives it to the vendor. That credential then sits in the vendor's infrastructure, usually with no IP restriction and broad SELECT rights. Once an attacker breaches the vendor, they can authenticate as that integration. Your MFA rules for humans never apply, because tokens and key pairs skip the interactive login.
It's the same pattern as the 2024 Snowflake intrusions and the 2025 Salesforce integration thefts. Attackers go after the trust relationship, not the platform. Three engineering lessons follow:
- Scope integrations like production code. A metrics tool rarely needs more than a few schemas. Give it a dedicated role with access to views, not raw tables holding PII.
- Bind credentials to the network. Snowflake lets you attach a network policy to a user or to a security integration (Snowflake OAuth, External OAuth, SCIM). A token that only works from the vendor's published egress IPs is much less useful once stolen.
- Watch for behaviour, not just logins. A service account that normally runs a few aggregate queries per hour and suddenly runs
SELECT *across many tables, or a largeCOPY INTOan external stage, is a strong signal.
What to do now
- Inventory third-party access. List integrations and service users and identify which ones belong to vendors:
SHOW INTEGRATIONS; SHOW USERS; -- look for service/integration users and their owners - Rotate anything a breached vendor held. Reset passwords, rotate key pairs (use
RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_2for a zero-downtime swap) and revoke OAuth refresh tokens. Disable integrations you no longer use:ALTER USER svc_vendor SET DISABLED = TRUE; - Apply network policies to integration users:
CREATE NETWORK RULE vendor_egress MODE = INGRESS TYPE = IPV4 VALUE_LIST = ('203.0.113.0/24'); CREATE NETWORK POLICY vendor_only ALLOWED_NETWORK_RULE_LIST = ('vendor_egress'); ALTER USER svc_vendor SET NETWORK_POLICY = vendor_only; - Hunt in your logs. Check
SNOWFLAKE.ACCOUNT_USAGE.LOGIN_HISTORYfor integration users logging in from new IPs or client types, andQUERY_HISTORYfor unusually large result sets or unloads since late March 2026. - Do the same in your other SaaS. Review connected apps in Salesforce, Google Workspace and Microsoft 365, plus cloud storage access keys, for every integration you granted the same vendor.
- Prepare for extortion. If you were affected, involve legal and incident response early. Groups like ShinyHunters contact victims directly and publish data that isn't paid for.