VENOM phishing kit targets executives' Microsoft 365 logins with AiTM and device codes

Abnormal found VENOM, a closed phishing-as-a-service kit using Unicode QR codes, AiTM and device-code phishing to hijack C-suite Microsoft 365 accounts.

TechLogHub Engineering Team
April 9, 2026
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New VENOM phishing attacks steal senior executives' Microsoft logins

Abnormal Security has uncovered VENOM, a closed-access phishing-as-a-service platform. From November 2025 to March 2026 it was used to steal Microsoft 365 access from CEOs, CFOs and other senior executives. It uses two methods, adversary-in-the-middle proxying and device-code phishing, and both get past standard MFA. If you own identity, email or internal tooling at your company, its persistence tricks show what your incident response needs to cover.

What happened

Abnormal published its findings on 2 April 2026, and BleepingComputer reported them on 9 April. The campaign hit named targets across more than 20 industries. Among recipients with a known title, 60% held C-level, President or Chairman roles. VENOM has licensing, campaign management and structured token storage, but Abnormal found no trace of it on public channels or underground forums.

The attack chain:

  1. Lure: A fake SharePoint document-sharing email, often about financial reports. The sender address is built from the target's own domain, the email includes a fabricated five-message thread, and randomised hidden HTML defeats hash and string matching.
  2. Unicode QR code: The QR code is drawn with Unicode block characters inside a <pre> tag, not attached as an image. Image-based QR scanners miss it, and it moves the victim to a phone outside corporate endpoint controls.
  3. Hidden target data: The victim's email address is double Base64-encoded in the URL fragment (after #). Browsers never send fragments to servers, so the address stays out of proxy logs and URL reputation feeds.
  4. Gatekeeping: A 385-entry user-agent blocklist, IP reputation checks, honeypots and sometimes proof-of-work challenges filter out researchers, who get redirected to X, Google, Amazon or Tesla.
  5. Harvest: Either an AiTM proxy of the real Microsoft login that relays the password and MFA code, or a DocuSign-themed device-code lure that gets the victim to approve a sign-in at Microsoft's own device login page.

Who is affected

  • Microsoft 365 and Entra ID tenants, especially executives and their assistants.
  • Organisations that rely on SMS, TOTP or push MFA, all of which AiTM relays.
  • Tenants that leave the OAuth device code flow enabled for everyone, even though few users need it.

What it means for developers and engineering teams

VENOM's persistence is the most important part. In AiTM mode, during the proxied session it registers an attacker-controlled authenticator on the victim's account. Entra ID logs show this as a SoftwareTokenActivated event with the device name NO_DEVICE. The victim's own authenticator stays in place, so nothing looks wrong. In device-code mode, the attacker receives a refresh token, and it survives a password reset. Unless an administrator explicitly revokes sessions and token grants, access continues.

The device code flow (RFC 8628) was designed for TVs and CLIs that can't show a browser. It is useful, but it lets an attacker start the flow and have the victim finish it on Microsoft's real domain. No fake login page is involved, so URL training doesn't help. If your own apps or CLIs use device code auth, show clearly which app and device is asking. Organisations should limit the flow to the users and apps that need it.

The URL-fragment trick is also worth noting for anyone who builds link scanners or logging: anything after # is invisible server-side by design.

What to do now

  1. Block the device code flow with a Conditional Access policy using the Authentication flows condition, and exclude only the accounts or devices that need it.
  2. Require phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 keys or passkeys) for executives and admins, using Conditional Access authentication strengths.
  3. Restrict MFA method registration to compliant devices or trusted locations, and alert on new SoftwareTokenActivated events, especially with NO_DEVICE.
  4. Update your incident response runbook to revoke sessions as well as reset passwords:
    Revoke-MgUserSignInSession -UserId [email protected]
    Also remove unknown authentication methods and review OAuth app consents.
  5. Tune mail filtering for <pre>-block QR codes and SharePoint or DocuSign lures sent from look-alike internal addresses.
  6. Brief executives and their assistants. Never approve a device code prompt you didn't start, and never scan a QR code in an email to open a document.

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VENOM PhaaS Targets Executives' Microsoft 365 Accounts | New Venom Phishing Attacks Steal Senior Executives Microsoft Logins