Engineer who locked out 254 servers in extortion plot pleads guilty, gets 32 months
Daniel Rhyne used scheduled tasks to lock his employer out of 254 servers and 3,284 PCs, demanding 20 BTC. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 32 months.

A former core infrastructure engineer at a New Jersey industrial company used his own admin access to schedule password resets and account deletions across the Windows domain, then demanded about $750,000 in bitcoin to stop. Daniel Rhyne pleaded guilty in April 2026 and was sentenced in September to 32 months in federal prison. The case is less about clever malware than about what one trusted administrator can do with built-in Windows tooling, which is why it matters to anyone who runs infrastructure.
What happened
According to the criminal complaint and the US Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey, Rhyne began the scheme in November 2023. Between 9 and 25 November he opened unauthorised remote desktop sessions using an administrator account and created scheduled tasks on the domain controller that would:
- delete 13 domain administrator accounts;
- change the passwords of 301 domain user accounts;
- change the passwords of two local administrator accounts used on 254 servers, and two more used on 3,284 workstations;
- shut down random servers and workstations over several days in December.
The tasks ran on the afternoon of 25 November 2023. Administrators received password-reset notifications and found the other domain admin accounts deleted. Shortly after, employees received an email titled "Your Network Has Been Penetrated" claiming backups had been deleted and threatening to shut down 40 servers a day for ten days unless the company paid 20 bitcoin, then worth about $750,000.
Investigators tied the activity to Rhyne through a hidden virtual machine created on 9 November, web searches made from it and his company laptop about clearing Windows logs and changing domain and local admin passwords, building access records, and a residential IP address. He was arrested in Kansas City on 27 August 2024. He pleaded guilty on 1 April 2026 to extortion involving a threat to damage a protected computer and intentional damage to a protected computer. On 28 September 2026, US District Judge Michael A. Shipp sentenced him to 32 months in prison.
Who is affected
- The victim, an unnamed industrial company headquartered in Somerset County, New Jersey, whose Windows domain, servers and workstations were targeted.
- More broadly, any organisation where a few administrators hold standing domain admin rights and local admin passwords are shared across many machines.
What it means for developers and engineering teams
Every step Rhyne took used legitimate administration features: RDP, scheduled tasks, net user-style password changes and account deletion. Nothing here would trip a signature-based antivirus. The defensive lessons are about privilege design and monitoring:
- Shared local admin passwords multiply damage. Two local admin credentials controlled 254 servers and two more controlled 3,284 workstations. Windows LAPS, which gives every machine a unique, rotated local admin password stored in Active Directory or Entra ID, removes that single point of failure.
- Standing domain admin rights are a liability. Just-in-time elevation and a privileged access management (PAM) tool mean no single engineer holds permanent rights to delete every other admin.
- Scheduled tasks on domain controllers should be rare and noisy. Windows logs task creation as Security event 4698. A new task on a DC created outside change windows is a high-value alert.
- Break-glass accounts matter. If all admin accounts can be deleted from one place, recovery depends on accounts kept offline and monitored.
What to do now
- Deploy Windows LAPS so each server and workstation has a unique local admin password. Retrieve one with
Get-LapsADPassword -Identity SERVER01 -AsPlainText. - Alert on high-risk events from domain controllers: 4698 (scheduled task created), 4724 (password reset attempt), 4726 (user account deleted) and changes to privileged groups (4728/4732/4756).
- Remove standing Domain Admin membership; use time-bound elevation with approval and session recording.
- Create and vault break-glass accounts and test that you can recover if all regular admin accounts are disabled.
- Inventory virtual machines on hypervisors and flag any not in your CMDB.
- Protect backups with separate credentials and immutability so an insider with domain admin cannot delete them.