Drift loses about $285M after attackers hijack its Solana Security Council multisig
Attackers drained about $285M from Solana's Drift using durable nonces to pre-sign admin transfers on a 2-of-5 multisig with no timelock. The lessons.

On 1 April 2026 an attacker drained roughly $280–285 million from Drift Protocol, a Solana-based perpetuals and lending exchange, without exploiting a single smart contract bug. They obtained two of five Security Council approvals in advance, used Solana's durable nonce feature to keep those signed transactions valid for days, and then executed an admin takeover in seconds. If you build or operate anything controlled by a multisig, the failure is in the governance process, and it is worth studying.
What happened
Drift said a malicious actor gained access "through a novel attack involving durable nonces" that led to a rapid takeover of its Security Council's admin powers. Drift said it found no flaw in its programs and no compromised seed phrases. Instead, the attack "involved unauthorized or misrepresented transaction approvals obtained prior to execution", which Drift suspects were obtained through social engineering. Drift put the loss at $280 million. Elliptic and TRM Labs estimate about $285–286 million, and TRM calls it the largest DeFi hack of 2026.
The timeline, pieced together from Drift, TRM Labs and BlockSec:
- 11–12 March: 10 ETH withdrawn from Tornado Cash funded the creation of a token called CarbonVote Token (CVT). The attacker minted 750 million CVT, added a few thousand dollars of liquidity on Raydium and wash-traded it to a price near $1.
- 23 March: four durable nonce accounts were created, two linked to Security Council members and two controlled by the attacker.
- 27 March: Drift migrated its Security Council to a Squads multisig with a 2-of-5 threshold and no timelock. This invalidated earlier signatures.
- 30 March: a new durable nonce account linked to a member of the new council appeared, showing that approvals had been collected again.
- 1 April, about 16:05 UTC: roughly a minute after Drift made a legitimate test withdrawal, the attacker submitted two pre-signed transactions four slots apart. They created, approved and executed an admin transfer. With admin control, the attacker listed CVT as collateral using an oracle it controlled, raised or removed withdrawal limits, and made 31 withdrawals in about 12 minutes. The assets included USDC, JLP, SOL, cbBTC, USDT and wETH.
Most of the funds were bridged to Ethereum within hours. Elliptic and TRM Labs reported on-chain indicators consistent with North Korean operators, including Tornado Cash staging and laundering patterns similar to the 2025 Bybit theft. Drift itself has not attributed the attack.
Who is affected
- Drift users with lending deposits, trading collateral or vault deposits. Drift suspended deposits and withdrawals and says it is working with security firms, bridges, exchanges and law enforcement to trace funds.
- Other protocols using low-threshold, zero-timelock multisigs for admin functions, on Solana or elsewhere.
What it means for developers and engineering teams
A normal Solana transaction includes a recent blockhash and expires after about 150 blocks, roughly a minute or two. A durable nonce replaces that blockhash with a value stored in an on-chain nonce account, and the transaction's first instruction advances the nonce. The signed transaction stays valid until someone advances that nonce. The feature exists for offline and custodial signing, but it means a signature collected today can be used next week, and the signer can't revoke it unless the nonce is advanced.
Combine that with a 2-of-5 threshold and no timelock and the result is predictable. An attacker who can persuade two signers to approve something they don't fully understand, perhaps presented as routine or hidden inside a batch, can hold those approvals and use them when it suits them. With no timelock, nobody has time to react.
Lessons that apply beyond crypto:
- A multisig is only as strong as what signers can actually verify. If signers approve raw bytes they can't decode, the threshold is a formality.
- Privileged changes need a delay. A timelock on admin transfers, new collateral listings and limit changes is the equivalent of a change freeze window. It gives monitoring time to act.
- Security controls shouldn't be changeable by the same keys in the same transaction. Withdrawal limits that an admin can lift instantly don't limit an attacker who gets admin.
- Price oracles for thin-liquidity assets can be manipulated cheaply. New collateral should start with tiny caps.
What to do now
- Add timelocks to admin transfers, upgrade authority changes, oracle changes and risk-parameter changes. Use an emergency path only for pausing, never for moving funds.
- Raise thresholds for the most powerful actions (for example 4-of-7) and keep signers on separate devices, organisations and communication channels.
- Make signers verify decoded intent. Use tooling that shows instruction-level effects ("UpdateAdmin to X") and an independent out-of-band check before signing.
- Restrict or monitor durable nonces for governance. Reject governance transactions that use a durable nonce, or alert when a nonce account names a council member as authority.
- Monitor on-chain admin events in real time and wire alerts to an automatic pause.
- Cap new collateral and require multiple independent price sources with liquidity checks before an asset counts towards borrowing power.
Related on TechLogHub
- Authorization: separating privileges for high-risk actions
Sources
- The Record: Drift confirms $280 million stolen
- The Hacker News: Drift loses $285 million in durable nonce attack
- TRM Labs: North Korean hackers attack Drift Protocol in $285 million heist
- BlockSec: Drift incident, multisig governance compromise via durable nonce
- BleepingComputer: Drift loses $280 million as hackers seize security council powers